



## Enhanced Centralized Medical Records Security In a Zero-Trust-based MFA Framework Using Formal Verification of Role-Based Access Control

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### ABSTRACT

The increased digitalization of the healthcare sector, has rippled across increased use of centralized medical data system to ensure interoperability, efficiency, and data-driven decision-making for better clinical outcomes. Increased usability and collaborative capabilities has yielded associated security and confidentiality concerns owing to the handling of extremely confidential patient data. Traditional security schemes are perimeter-focused and compliance-oriented, have inadequately dealt with sophisticated attacks and complex access behaviors. This study proposes a formally verified Zero Trust in a centralized medical data system, to improve reliability and trustworthiness. It explores role-based access control systems, MFA, and AES-256 encryption to implement continuous authentication, fine-grained authorization, and end-to-end data confidentiality. It dynamically assesses every request for access in terms of formally verified security attributes. Its model checking and formal verification are test to ensure authentication integrity, accuracy of the enforcement of the Access Control System, and resistance of the system to privilege escalation attacks and attacks, respectively. Based on the results obtained, the entire unauthorized and privilege escalation attack has been completely removed, and the resistance rate has been reported to be 100 percent, which is much higher than comparable architectures. Performance metrics, including response times and availability, the entire scenario has been tested, and the results revealed that the response times are measured at least at 120 milliseconds, and the entire system can handle the throughput of up to 500 requests per second, which is quite higher than existing architectures and approaches. For evaluating the performance and efficiency of the constructed approach, the entire scenario has been compared with the available blockchain-based security architectures, and the results concluded that the resultant approach possesses higher efficiency and lower complexity, which are associated with shorter response times without sacrificing the security functionalities and goals, respectively.

**Keywords:** Zero Trust, Formal Verification, Healthcare Data, Role-Based Access Control, MFA



## 1. INTRODUCTION

Centralized medical data systems have overtime become the architectural nexus for modern healthcare processes. They help create, store, access, and share patient records across institutions (Ejeh et al., 2024). This choice is a result of the long-standing inefficiencies that characterized paper files, and digitally incompatible platforms that posed issues to continuous care (Sheng et al., 2023). Essentially, the centralized medical database has enabled medical specialists to access patients' complete medical history at the point of care, which has reduced the prospects of mistaking a medical diagnosis and improved treatment outcomes (Aghware, Okpor, et al., 2024; Aghware et al., 2025). Looking at the functional aspect, the centralized medical database has a multitude of obvious benefits for the healthcare systems. The centralized database has simplified medical authority structures and enabled medical institutions to formulate overarching binding medical authority guidelines for the centralized medical database platform performance (Olaniyi et al., 2023). This has confirmed that the centralized medical database has played a critical role in turning medical files into active medical resources.

The implementation of the centralized medical database has confirmed that healthcare systems that use the platform benefit from enhanced medical coordination, reduced duplicate medical testing, and improvements in the healthcare system security (Binitie et al., 2024, 2025). The centralized medical database converts files into an actively utilized tool. It has impacted EHR in several obvious ways that infringe on the medical file security and privacy considerations. Its platform has aggregated huge amounts of several actionable medical files containing medical identities, medical files, medical histories, and medical bills for every medical specialist to access and use. This has ratcheted up the allure of the healthcare system to cyber attackers (Aghware et al., 2023b, 2023a; Ojugo et al., 2024). With absolute certainty, medical file security breaches tend to have far-reaching consequences compared to other file security breaches, since medical files are immutable and can be tapped for long durations for multiple medical frauds, identities, and medical social engineering attacks (Li et al., 2024; Otorokpo et al., 2024).

With the growth of centralized medical data systems, regulatory bodies have responded by imposing tough legal regimes to ensure the security and protection of patients' medical data (Omede et al., 2024). The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act mandated the minimum security criteria for protecting electronic protected health information, including administrative, technical, and physical controls that include the principles of confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Setiadi, Muslikh, et al., 2024; Setiadi, Rustad, et al., 2025). GDPR explores an extensive protection for medical data such as specific consent, data minimization, and enforceable rights for the individual (Ibrahim & Ali, 2023). Collectively, these are imperative (Agrafiotis et al., 2015) as its compliance impacts on the architectural implementation of the system. The processes of access control, encryption, and audit logs have become the mandatory elements (Akazue et al., 2023). Role-Based Access Control has become prevalent in access management that aligns with clinical responsibilities (San et al., 2025). By assigning access to each role, Role-Based Access Control is more adaptable to address medical record concerns for more effective security (Sun & Gu, 2021).



Despite these improvements, breaches in medical sector have become more widespread and serious as well, as most high-end security breaches and ransomware attacks reveal the vulnerability and inadequacy of the current medical systems and processes for access, security authentication, and security configurations. These cases occur as complaints with established regulations, and as the gap between security compliance and its validation for all operating factors (Aghaunor et al., 2026; Ugbotu, Aghaunor, et al., 2025; Ugbotu, Ako, et al., 2025).

This problem partly resides in traditional security validation modes. Penetration testing, vulnerability scanning, and periodic security audits are considered essential approaches in validating the security position within healthcare information systems (Okeke & Omojola, 2025). The approaches are essential and have been traditionally accepted; however, they are less comprehensive. Pen-testing simulates attack based on known patterns/weaknesses. Its test on only a fraction of possible exploits means it lacks a comprehensive security implications of healthcare system security (Aghaunor, Agboi, et al., 2025). Security audits are mainly concerned with hardware as well as software system reviews based on specific security standards and guidelines. The approach typically presents a specific security system position at a particular point in time; therefore, security weaknesses may be present when particular security sequences are applied but are potentially overlooked when applications interact in centralized medical record systems (Onoma, Agboi, Ugbotu, et al., 2025; Onoma, Ako, Anazia, Oghorodi, et al., 2025).

Traditional validation lacks the ability to engage emergent dynamics of role change. The continued evolution in role change(s) requires an urgent contingency for accessing data with third-party integrations (Nur et al., 2025; Ojugo & Eboka, 2019). Such dynamics are associated with state spaces that cannot be completely validated via testing, for procedures where systems achieve secure validation of security risks (Onoma, Agboi, Geteloma, et al., 2025; Onoma, Ako, Ojugo, Geteloma, et al., 2025). Modern dynamics in the complex healthcare systems yield increased validation difficulty and often require advanced validation procedures where systems only achieve probable security validation rather than absolute and provable validation, meaning the validation of the remaining security risks within the healthcare delivery systems (Hakonen, 2022; Oyemade et al., 2016; Oyemade & Ojugo, 2021).

Zero-trust extends traditional security from fixed perimeter approaches to dynamic approaches based on identity. It diminishes trust, and does not ensure correctness of records (Tahir et al., 2025). However, it remains susceptible to logical inconsistencies, conflicting policies definitions, privilege vulnerabilities, and authentication bypassing unless they are formally defined and verified (Aleisa et al., 2025). In healthcare, the zero-trust approach has led to the increased use of formal verification approaches. These rely on mathematically precise methodologies to demonstrate the satisfaction of certain specified properties by the system for any execution of the system within the specified model. In contrast to the testing approach to system validation and verification, formal verification explores state spaces exhaustively to offer mathematically correct statements about system safety and liveness (Salam et al., 2024). Essentially, formal verification of system architecture remains a radical departure from the approach to system validation and verification. In the case of medical systems, it remains imperative to note that availability remains an absolute necessity.



Failure to gain access to relevant information may pose serious threats to patient safety. If well-defined, the benefits of a centralized system is based on better availability guarantees and operational models (Malasowe, Aghware, et al., 2024; Malasowe, Edim, et al., 2024; Malasowe, Okpako, et al., 2024). Formal verification extends the Zero Trust approach by ensuring fault-tolerance during adversarial activities. It formally verifies a Zero Trust scheme remains secure. This architecture offers mathematically correct approaches to system validation and verification based on the concept of Zero Trust (Odiakaose et al., 2025). It utilizes the benefits of both formal verification and Zero Trust for system validation. This has led to the need to augment validation and verification primarily to ensure the relevant validation and verification of proposed approaches to system validation (Atuduhor et al., 2024; Brizimor et al., 2024; Ifioko et al., 2024).

### 1.1 Motivation for Formal Verification within Zero Trust Architectures


The emergence of the new security model, Zero Trust, has been the clear response to the need for new security measures, which have been made essential by the realization of the inadequacy of traditional trust-based security measures within the perimeter (Polge et al., 2021). In the health sector, which deals with critical health records, the assumption of trusting traffic within the network has proved inadequate time and again due to increased breaches of security within the health sector. The new approach views security as the validation of every request, without consideration of the source (Uddin et al., 2021). Its operation in the context of centralized medical data storage is required by both experts and administrative users be provided with access. However, they also need differing levels of access. Zero Trust Architecture designs assist in this problem in several ways that include Role-Based Access Control, Multi Factor Authentication, and encryption enforcement mechanisms (Pratama et al., 2025).

Thus, Zero Trust models complies with its HIPAA and GDPR regulations (Ojugo & Eboka, 2018b, 2018a) as they both require strong control and accountability of data access. In spite of these advantages, the majority of Zero Trust systems in the healthcare sector focus extensively on the correctness of configuration and execution at runtime rather than offering provable assurances. The evaluation of access control policies is generally conducted via rigorous testing, auditing, and monitoring; these methods offer incomplete assurances (Agboi, Onoma, et al., 2025). Errors in roles, authentication procedures, or encryption may potentially go unnoticed until exploited (Zuama et al., 2025). The assurance gap between security offered and the realities – still pose a threat. Formal verification guarantees security via exhaustive proofs of all possible system states and execution traces defined by a model (Jabbar et al., 2021). Instead of testing execution traces, formal verification techniques like model checking or proof assistants assess whether security properties can be violated for all permissible system conditions. With Zero Trust systems, it enables features like non-bypass of MFAs, role separation, or compliance of encryption to be proven (Ojugo & Ekurume, 2021; Ojugo & Otakore, 2018, 2021).

There has been an emerging body of research with the need to incorporate formal verification as part of safety and security-critical healthcare systems and applications where patient safety and regulation converge (Lötsch et al., 2022). Formal verification of security adds up to the body of best practices to prove that it is such, as opposed to relying merely upon opinion and anecdotal evidence (Sheikhtaheri & Sabermahani, 2022). The need for formal verification of security definitely comes into play especially in relation to medical data records stored in central systems where one bug will



As in Figure 1, security during the authentication process is ensured via mandatory MFA. Once a user initiates the access request, the system ensures identity verification via primary means of identification, such as password or a digital identity. This follows with the secondary verification process namely: (a) one-time passcodes, (b) biometrics, and (c) secure tokens (Anthony-Akhutie et al., 2025; Ejeh et al., 2025; Omosor et al., 2025).



**Figure 1: Centralized Zero Trust Architecture**

Thus, system authorizes processes via roles, and authentication is not treated as a one-time process. Session validity is continuously checked, and at intervals – re-authenticated with abnormally high access patterns, and privilege escalates (Ojugo & Yoro, 2013, 2020). This, aligns with the requirements for Zero Trust, and prevents any risks to session hijack or replay attacks (Akazue et al., 2024). Next is encryption enforcement in which all patient data stored in the centralized database, is encrypted with AES 256. Thus, data exchanges between users, gateway servers, and the need-based services are ensured using the encrypted communication mechanism. Importantly, the users can get access to the decrypted data only after successful authentication and authorization processes. It implies encryption scheme, RBAC and MFA are not functioning independently – but, are rather interlinked (Okofu, Akazue, et al., 2024; Okofu, Anazia, et al., 2024; Yoro & Ojugo, 2019a, 2019b). Algorithm 1 describes Zero Trust access control flow.



#### Algorithm Zero Trust Access Control (Req)

```

1: Initialize Audit Log
2: if NOT Verify_Primary_Credentials (UID) OR NOT Verify_MFA(UID, Context) then
3:   Log Event (Audit Log, UID, "Authentication Failed"): return DENY
4: end if
5: if (Resource, Operation) ∉ Get_RBAC_Permissions (Role) OR Detect_Anomaly
   (UID, Context) then
6:   Log Event (AuditLog, UID, "Unauthorized or Suspicious Access"): return DENY
7: end if
8: Encrypted Data ← Fetch_Encrypted_Data (Resource)
9: if Encrypted Data = NULL then return DENY end if
10: Decrypted Data ← AES256_Decrypt (Encrypted Data, Session_Key)
11: Secure_Channel_Transmit (Decrypted_Data)
12: Log_Event (AuditLog, UID, "Access Granted", Resource, Operation): return
GRANT
  
```

## 2.2 Adversary Model Aligned with HIPAA and GDPR Threat Vectors

The adversary aligns with the HIPAA/GDPR risk factors recognized in the healthcare industry based on empirical evidence from incidence responses. Adversaries are classified into categories based on their capabilities and access objectives. They could be internal or external with varying capabilities or access goals set forth by Shojaei et al. in 2024. External attackers are expected to have network access at the interface level but without any trust or credentials. Internal attackers can be malicious insiders or compromised trusted users who have credentials but attempt to breach their own privileges. This is consistent with regulations acknowledging that insider threats are a serious source of risk to confidentiality and integrity within healthcare data (Habib et al., 2022; Setiadi, Susanto, et al., 2024).

Moreover, under this model, there is recognition of partial system breaches, for example, when encrypted data stores are compromised or network communication. However, there is no expectation that these modal uses of cryptographic primitives, say AES-256 or strong authentication factors, are compromised by cryptanalytic attacks (Okpor et al., 2024, 2025; Omoruwou et al., 2024). Realistic threat models, therefore, are consistent with regulatory demands, which targets at system misuse rather than cryptanalysis broken by attackers (Ojugo & Nwankwo, 2021c, 2021b, 2021a). Denial of service attacks will also qualify on availability criteria, which are essential under HIPAA. However, physical attacks or cryptanalysis at a level used by nations-state attackers are deemed to be beyond the scope of threat models expected for healthcare system compliance (Quamara & Singh, 2023).





$$\text{Decrypt}(d, K_s) = \begin{cases} d_{\text{plain}} & \text{if } K_s \text{ is valid} \\ \emptyset & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad \text{eqn(4)}$$

Two critical properties are formally defined (Aghaunor, Omede, et al., 2025; Odiakaose et al., 2024):

1. **Safety (Access Control):** No unauthorized user can access any resource (Ojugo, Akazue, Ejeh, Ashioba, Odiakaose, et al., 2023; Ojugo, Odiakaose, Emordi, Ako, et al., 2023; Ojugo, Odiakaose, Emordi, Ejeh, et al., 2023):

$$\forall u \in U, \forall o \in O, \forall a \in A: \neg \text{Access}(u, o, a) \Rightarrow \text{AccessDenied}(u, o, a) \quad \text{eqn(5)}$$

2. **Liveness (Authentication Success):** Authorized users can eventually complete authentication under normal conditions where  $C(t)$  represents system context at time  $t$  (Ojugo & Eboka, 2020a, 2020b).

$$\forall u \in U, \exists t \in \mathbb{N}: \text{Auth}(u, C(t)) = \text{TRUE} \quad \text{eqn(6)}$$

State-space constraints are applied to limit combinatorial explosion:

$$\text{State Space} = |U| \cdot |R| \cdot |P| \cdot |C| \cdot |D| \cdot |A| \quad \text{eqn(7)}$$

TLA<sup>+</sup> model checking explores all reachable states  $S_r \subseteq \text{StateSpace}$  to verify that both safety and liveness invariants hold across all transitions:

$$\forall S_r: \text{Invariant}(S_r) = \text{TRUE} \quad \text{eqn(8)}$$

Let resilience metric  $R_s$  be probability that authorized access is correctly enforced despite attack scenarios:

$$R_s = \frac{\text{Number of Successful Authorizations}}{\text{Total Authorization Attempts}} \quad \text{eqn(9)}$$

For centralized systems  $R_s^C$  and decentralized systems  $R_s^D$ , the theorem proving problem reduces to:

$$\forall S_r: R_s^C \geq R_s^D \text{ under the same adversary model} \quad \text{eqn(10)}$$

Even with formal verification, centrally enforced strict least privilege, achieved through the combination of RBAC, MFA, and AES-256 encryption, minimizes the attack surface and demonstrates better results for access control consistency than decentralized approaches (Ugbotu, Ako, et al., 2025).

#### 1.4 Key Performance Metrics (KPMs)

The rationale for these metrics includes: (a) penetration Resistance verifies the strength of the security layers of RBAC, MFA, and AES-256, (b) availability ensures that healthcare system operations continue when attacked or if there is a spike, (c) Latency and Throughput represent the efficiency level for real-time access, (d) Scalability defines adaptability in large deployments, (e)



coverage compliance – a measure of adhering to regulations, and (f) Resilience and RTO are pointers to the system’s ability to tolerate failure (Agboi, Emordi, et al., 2025; Ugbotu, Emordi, et al., 2025; Zhang et al., 2022). Results are seen in Table 2.

**Table 2: Key Performance Metrics**

Metric Name	Description	Measurement / Evaluation Method
<b>Penetration Resistance</b>	Measures the system’s ability to resist unauthorized access or attacks.	Model checking, simulated attacks (external/internal).
<b>Availability</b>	Proportion of time the system remains operational and responsive.	Monitor uptime under normal and adversarial load scenarios.
<b>Latency (ms)</b>	Average response time for access requests.	Measure round-trip time from user request to data retrieval.
<b>Scalability</b>	Ability to handle increasing users, devices, or requests without degradation.	Horizontal (nodes) and vertical (server resources) scaling tests.
<b>Operational Complexity</b>	Effort required to deploy, maintain, and monitor the system.	Qualitative scoring or resource estimation.
<b>Audit Coverage</b>	Rate of access attempts and events log.	Verify log requests, change, and anomalies.
<b>Recovery Time Objective (RTO)</b>	Time to restore normal operations after an incident or attack.	Measure system recovery after simulated failures.
<b>Resilience Score</b>	Composite measure of resistance to attack, recovery, and continuity.	Derived from penetration, availability, and RTO metrics.
<b>Compliance</b>	Degree to which the system satisfies regulatory standards (HIPAA/GDPR).	Checklist-based evaluation against relevant regulations.
<b>Throughput</b>	Number of requests system handles per sec	Load testing under simulated workloads.

### 3. RESULT AND ANALYSIS

The results obtained for verification it can be confirmed that the centralized architecture design ensures 100% penetration resistance for unauthorized access, bypassing MFA and insider privilege escalation attacks, validating the effectiveness of RBAC, MFA, and AES-256 encryption policy enforcement. The results for system availability tests under simulated hostile environments show 99.3% system availability, ensuring substantial robustness even in light DoS attacks. The comparative analysis performed with respect to blockchain architecture designs indicates that while they entail lower latency and easier management processes with comparable security guarantees, they are less scalable and more complex in nature than the centralized design. Despite this, they retain advantages related to scalability due to their decentralized nature in medical data architecture designs.







**Figure 4: Latency and Throughput Comparison**

### 3.4 Scalability and Resilience

**Table 4: Scalability and Resilience Metrics**

Metric	Value	Notes
Horizontal Scalability	Up to 200 nodes	Supports distributed access gateways
Vertical Scalability	Up to 16 vCPUs	Handles high request loads
Resilience Score	9.8 / 10	Measured via attack simulations
Recovery Time Objective	< 5 min	Rapid recovery from failures

The system scales efficiently both horizontally and vertically, accommodating growing workloads without compromising resilience. A recovery time under 5 minutes ensures minimal disruption during incidents, while a high resilience score (9.8/10) confirms strong defense and operational stability. This makes the architecture suitable for large-scale healthcare deployments.





Thus, the centralized Zero trust scheme yields a well-rounded, useful solution for hospitals: high levels of security, rapid access, compliance, and ease of management, while blockchain benefit for healthcare includes decentralization and higher transparency in healthcare with availability and safety as top priority. This centralized Zero Trust scheme remain a functional option (Onoma, Ugbotu, Aghaunor, Agboi, et al., 2025; Setiadi, Ojugo, et al., 2025).

**Table 5: Centralized vs Blockchain Architectures**

Metric	Centralized Zero Trust	Blockchain Alternative	Comments
Penetration Resistance	100 (%)	98 (%)	Formal verification supports centralized design
Latency (ms)	120	350	Blockchain adds overhead
Scalability	Moderate	High	Blockchain scales horizontally
Operational Complexity	Medium	High	Centralized easier to maintain
Compliance Alignment	Full	Partial	Centralized better HIPAA/GDPR alignment

#### 4. CONCLUSION

This research work proposes an integrated Zero Trust architecture for the management of patient data in the healthcare sector, incorporating the concepts of Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), and AES-256 for protecting EHRs. Zero Trust ensures a controlled, traceable access to safeguard EHRs from both external and internal attacks, but also from misuse of authorized personnel. The architecture has proven to resist penetration attacks by 100% for credential theft, privilege escalation, and replay attacks through formal verification, and it is highly available, with 99.3% availability when subjected to attacks that is crucial for medical environments, considering the direct relation between patient data availability and the quality of medical treatment.

Performance assessment reveals that a centralized architecture provides low-latency and high-throughput connectivity, performing better than blockchain solutions, which, though decentralized and tamper-proof, add extra latency. Also, centralized Zero Trust makes management, audit trail compliance, and interfacing with an existing EHR system extremely feasible, making it quite practical for an environment such as a hospital setting. Decentralization and tamper-proof characteristics make blockchain a desirable technology, but a centralized Zero Trust framework yield an efficient solution for today's healthcare setup, ensuring not only patient but also data security.













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