







## 2.1 Research Motivation

The password of the genuine driver could be guessed, making stealing by a thief easier and driving by an unauthorized driver is inevitable. However, [3] developed a multi-level authentication ignition system, where the driver's fingerprint was embedded in a smart card to turn ON the ignition system. The problems with the [3] system were the fingerprint fooling, high cost of smart-card production and shimming of smart cards. Therefore, this research attempted to solve the aforementioned problems through the development of a vehicle driving authorization permit and fake driver detection system using fingerprint technique.

The specific objectives of this research are to:

- The significance of this research are:

- 3

### 3. METHODOLOGY

The development of a vehicle driving authorization permit using fingerprint technique towards fake driver detection was detailed as follows:

#### 3.1 Architectural Diagram

The architectural block diagram of the developed system is illustrated in Figure 1. The vehicle theft detection and authorization system had three fundamental modules. The modules were enrolment, driver's, authentication and Global System for Mobile (GSM).




Figure 1: Architectural diagram

#### i. Enrolment Module

The enrolment module allowed the real owner and an additional four authorized drivers to enrol into the database for the permission to drive a registered vehicle. A particular vehicle was assigned to a maximum number of five to drive the vehicle. However, in case of an emergency, where the real owner and other authorized drivers were not available, the real owner requested an authorization code for the emergency driver. The emergency driver was a driver who had been enrolled with a particular vehicle into the database as an emergency driver and had the authorization to drive a vehicle.

The developed system allowed only the real owner of the vehicle to request for a new driver through a registered mobile number. Also, if the real owner died, the other four authorized drivers assigned to the vehicle of the deceased had to report in persons to the nearest office for notification and re-assignment of ownership. During enrolment, drivers' fingerprints, vehicle chassis number, drivers' GSM number were significantly required for the enrolment among others particulars.

## ii. Fingerprint Minutiae Points Analysis

The ridge-ends and ridge bifurcations detection analyses were performed on the drivers' fingerprint image acquired. The fingerprint pre-processing involves Normalization, Segmentation, Fingerprint Image Enhancement and Binarization as illustrated in Figure 2. Figure 3 shows a local neighbourhood of each pixel of a driver's ridge-ends and ridge bifurcations and Figure 4 shows ridges end and bifurcations characteristics.




Figure 2: Fingerprint pre-processing




Figure 3: Local neighbourhood of each pixel of ridge-end and bifurcation




Figure 4: Ridges end and bifurcations characteristics

To identify the ridge-end and bifurcation point, a crossing number (CN) identification technique used in Olagunju (2018) was adopted:

$$CN = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i=1}^8 |P_i - P_{i+1}| \quad \dots\dots\dots(1)$$

In equation 1,  $P_9 = P_1$ .

Therefore, the attribute of the driver's fingerprint features was represented by  $D_{FT}$  and it was expressed as:

$$D_f = \frac{D_{f1}}{\sqrt{D_{f1} + D_{f2}}} \dots\dots\dots(2)$$

Where  $D_{f1}$  and  $D_{f2}$  were the fingerprint ridge and bifurcation scores respectively. The  $D_f$  was the driver's fingerprint template score during enrolment stored in the database for reference use. The decimal representation of letters in the chassis number was used in the fusion technique.


$$D_{ET} = f(D_f, V_{Cn}, \beta) = \frac{8.2(V_{Cn} * D_f)}{D_f} + \left(\frac{1}{\beta}\right) \dots\dots\dots(3)$$

### lii Drivers' module

#### iv. Authentication module

The disparity in the record stored in the database with respect to the vehicle showed that the vehicle was in the hand of the fake driver. This authentication technique was used to detect fake drivers and theft. Anytime the destination code was not received at the checking point, the driver was charged to be a fake driver. The confirmation received through the registered mobile phone of the driver signified that the destination code was received and readily available at the checking point for authentication as the vehicle moved from one town to another until the final destination was reached.



To achieve a moderate acceptance and rejection rates of the driver's fingerprint during the authentication, a threshold value  $D_{fh}$  was computed as follows:

$$D_{fh} = 0.78(D_f) \dots\dots\dots(4)$$

This equation implies that seventy-eight per cent (78%) of the driver's fingerprint features were used to obtain a value,  $D_{fh}$ . The value of  $D_{fa}$  was the fingerprint's score of a driver during authentication at the checking point and it was computed using Equation 2. In line with the threshold value, fuzzy logic was used for the decision on the acceptance and rejection of the driver at the checking point. Fuzzy logic is a computational technique that deals with the "degrees of truth" not the Boolean logic of either "true" or "false" (0 or 1) on which the modern computer is designed and developed.

Therefore, if

$$D_{fh} \leq D_{fa} \leq D_f \dots\dots\dots(5)$$

then the driver's fingerprint was accepted.

$$D_{fh} > D_{fa} > D_f \dots\dots\dots(6)$$

then the driver's fingerprint was rejected.

At the authentication stage, let the matching score of the driver's fingerprint be  $D_{fa}$ , as computed in Equations 5 and 6, and the vehicle chassis number (VCN) be  $V_{Cna}$ . Therefore, the driver's ticket  $D_{AT}$ , for permission to proceed on the journey was computed and generated by fusing  $D_{fa}$  and  $V_{Cna}$  as follows.

$$D_{AT} = f(D_{fa}, V_{Cna}, \beta) = \frac{8.2(V_{Cna} * D_{fa})}{D_{fa}} + \left(\frac{1}{\beta}\right) \dots\dots\dots(7)$$

The  $D_{ET}$  was the driver's ticket generated during the enrolment and the  $D_{AT}$  was the driver's ticket generated during the authentication. Mathematically, the  $D_{TA}$  may not be equalled to the  $D_{TE}$  before the driver was permitted to proceed to drive the vehicle from the checking point. However, the value of  $D_{AT}$  must not be lesser than the value of  $D_{ET}$ . As long as the threshold value,  $D_{fa}$  was satisfied and the  $V_{Cna}$  was correct, the driver was granted permission to proceed on the journey.

#### v. GSM module

The GSM module received the destination code from the driver, retrieved the driver's details from the central database and transferred the same destination code to the authentication module at the checking point. The enrolled drivers of the vehicle used the registered mobile number to send the code and received a confirmation of the destination.

### 3.2 Algorithm

The algorithm used for the software development of the vehicle driving authorization permit using fingerprint technique is depicted on the next page.



Start

Select an operation; //operation on the homepage  
Form1: Enrolment;  
Form2: Edit Driver's/Vehicle details;  
Form3: Authentication;

Case Form1:

Start  
Enrol driver's details, d; //i.e Name, mobile number  
Acquire, process and store driver's fingerprint features,  $D_f$ ; //fingerprint at enrolment  
Enrol the vehicle's particulars,  $V_p$ ; // model/type, colour  
Enrol the chassis number,  $V_{cn}$ ; // Chassis number at enrolment  
 $D_{ET} = ((8.2(V_{cn} * D_f))/(D_f)) / (1/\beta)$ ; //Fuse  $D_f$  and  $V_{cn}$   
Save  $D_{ET}$ , d,  $V_p$  and  $V_{cn}$ ; // save the records  
End; // End the new enrolment

Case Form2:

Start  
Open the driver's details, d,  $D_f$ ; // including other records  
Open the vehicle's details,  $V_p$ ,  $V_{cn}$ ;  
Confirm and delete d,  $D_f$ ,  $V_p$ ,  $V_{cn}$ ;  
Open new enrolment page;  
Enrol driver's details, d; //i.e Name, mobile number  
Acquire, process and store driver's fingerprint features,  $D_f$ ; //fingerprint at enrolment  
Enrol the vehicle's particulars,  $V_p$ ; // model/type, colour  
Enrol the chassis number,  $V_{cn}$ ; // Chassis number at enrolment  
 $D_{ET} = ((8.2(V_{cn} * D_f))/(D_f)) / (1/\beta)$ ; //Fuse  $D_f$  and  $V_{cn}$   
Save  $D_{ET}$ , d,  $V_p$  and  $V_{cn}$ ; // save the records  
End; // End the Re-enrolment

Case Form3:

Start  
Input chassis number,  $V_{cna}$ ; // Chassis number at authentication  
Acquire, process and compare driver's fingerprint,  $D_{fa}$ ; //fingerprint at authentication  
 $D_{AT} = ((8.2(V_{cna} * D_{fa}))/D_{fa}) / (1/\beta)$ ; //Fuse  $D_{fa}$  and  $V_{cna}$   
String message1 = " SUCCESSFUL ";  
String message2 = " PERMISSION to proceed is GRANTED ";  
String message3 = " NOT SUCCESSFUL ";  
String message4 = " ARREST....THIS FAKE DRIVER ";  
If  
Start  
 $D_{ET} = D_{AT}$ ;  
Show (message1, message2);  
Else  
Show (message3, message4);  
End; // End the if....else condition  
End; // End the Authentication

End

### 3.3 Software development

The source code of the vehicle driving authorization permit using fingerprint technique towards fake driver detection was developed using Visual C# in Microsoft visual studio 2010 ultimate version and Microsoft SQL Database was used for the database management system to store all the data. Figures 5, 6 and 7 were the screenshots of the developed application for the vehicle driving authorization and fake driver detection.




Figure 5: Homepage of the system

Figure 6: Enrolment page of the system




Figure 7: Driver's authentication status

### 3.3 Standard Metrics for System Evaluation

The standard metrics explained below were adopted to evaluate the system performance. These metrics are:

1. **The True Acceptance Rate (TAR)** refers to the likelihood that the biometric system correctly accepts a genuine driver and matches the template stored in the database.
2. **The True Rejection Rate (TRR)** refers to the probability that the biometric system correctly rejects a fake driver (imposter) and there is no match of a template stored in the database.
3. **The False Acceptance Rate (FAR)** refers to the likelihood that the biometric system incorrectly accepts a fake driver (imposter) and incorrectly matches a template stored in the database.
4. **The False Rejection Rate (FRR)** refers to the likelihood that the biometric system incorrectly rejects a genuine driver and there is no match of the template of the genuine in the database.
5. **The Mean Time-to-Enrol (MTTE)** refers to the mean-time required by the biometric system to collect, process and create a reference template for a driver and successfully store in the database.
6. **The Equal Error Rate (EER)** refers to the point or value where FRR and FAR are equal at a specific threshold value. The lower the value of EER, the better is the accuracy of the system.
7. **The Total Success Rate (TSR)** refers to the number of attempts that are successfully achieved in true acceptance and true rejection. The accuracy refers to the degree of correctness of a biometric true value of individual acquired, measured, processed and stored with a biometric system.

### 3.4 Research Design and Sample

An experimental design was adopted and two groups were randomly selected for testing the system. The first group comprised of the genuine drivers and the second group included fake drivers that were distinguished with tags. A purposive sampling technique was used to select forty (40) genuine drivers and twenty (20) fake driver from each of the five towns. Therefore, a total of one hundred and fifty (200) genuine drivers and one hundred (100) fake drivers.

#### 4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

A series of pilot experiments were conducted to determine a suitable threshold value for authentication. At 0.78 (78%) threshold value, an Equal Error Rate (EER) of acceptance and rejection of the diver's fingerprint during the authentication was achieved as illustrated in Figure 8.




Figure 8: Error Tradeoff curve

After the pilot experiments, the developed system was then tested in five towns from five different states in Nigeria. The towns were Oro, Akure, Gwagwalada, Minna and Ile-Ife.

Individual	Accept	Reject	Total
Genuine	TA	FR	GT
Imposter (Fake driver)	FA	TR	IT
Grand Total	A	R	G

=

Individual	Accept	Reject	Total
Genuine	193	7	200
Imposter (Fake driver)	4	96	100
Grand Total	197	103	300

1. True Acceptance Rate (TAR) =  $\frac{\text{Total True Accept}}{\text{Total True Attempts}} = \frac{TA}{GT} = \frac{193}{200} = 0.965$
- 2.
3. True Rejection Rate (TRR) =  $\frac{\text{Total True Reject}}{\text{Total False Attempts}} = \frac{TR}{IT} = \frac{96}{100} = 0.96$
- 4.
5. False Acceptance Rate (FAR) =  $\frac{\text{Total False Accept}}{\text{Total False Attempts}} = \frac{4}{100} = 0.04$
- 6.
7. False Rejection Rate (FRR) =  $\frac{\text{Total False Reject}}{\text{Total True Attempts}} = \frac{7}{200} = 0.035$
- 8.
9. Equal Error Rate (EER) =  $\frac{FAR}{2} = \frac{0.04 + 0.035}{2} = 0.0375$  (3.75%)
- 10.
11. Total Success Rate (TSR) =  $\frac{TAR + TRR}{2} = \frac{0.965 + 0.96}{2} = 0.9625$
12. Accuracy =  $1 - EER = 1 - 0.0375 = 0.9625$  (96.25%)
13. Mean Time-to-Enrol (MTTE) = 49 seconds

The proposed system of [11] was used for comparison as indicated in Table I.

**Table I: Performance comparison**

S/n	Parameters	Ref [11]	Developed System
1	Number of features	250	300
2	TAR	0.93	0.965
3	TRR	0.78	0.96
4	Mean-time	1mins 13sec	49 sec

The False Rejection Rate (FRR) of the developed system was 0.035, the Total Success Rate (TSR) was 0.9625 (96.25) and the time of processing reduced from 1 minute 13 seconds in the existing system to 49 seconds in the developed system.

## 5. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, vehicle driving authorization permit and fake driver detection using fingerprint technique was designed, developed, tested and evaluated. The developed system was able to suitably identified fake drivers and permitted genuine drivers to proceed on the journey that was earlier specified. The result of the analysis of the data obtained showed an excellent system accuracy value of 96.25% with a lower Equal Error Rate of 3.75% and the mean time required by the biometric system to collect, process and create a reference template was 49 seconds.



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